Abstract. Trust is an approach to managing the uncertainty about autonomous entities and the information they store, and so can play an important role in any decentralized system. As a result, trust has been widely studied in multiagent systems and related fields such as the semantic web. Here we introduce a simple approach to reasoning about trust with logic, describe how it can be combined with reasoning about beliefs using logic, and demonstrate its use on an example. The example highlights a number of issues related to resolving weighted arguments.
Introduction
Trust is an approach to managing the uncertainty about autonomous entities and the information they deal with. As a result, trust can play an important role in any decentralized system. As computer systems have become increasingly distributed, and control in those systems has become more decentralized, trust has become steadily more important within Computer Science [4, 18] .
Thus, for example, we see work on trust in peer-to-peer networks, including the EigenTrust algorithm [22] -a variant of PageRank [34] where downloads from a source play the role of outgoing hyperlinks and which is effective in excluding peers who want to disrupt the network -and the work in [1] that prevents peers from manipulating their trust values to get preferential downloads. [52] is concerned with manipulation in mobile ad-hoc networks, and looks to prevent nodes from getting others to transmit their messages while refusing to transmit the messages of others.
The internet, as the largest distributed system of all, is naturally a target of much of the research on trust. There have been studies, for example, on the development of trust in ecommerce [31, 43, 51] , on mechanisms to determine which sources to trust when faced with multiple conflicting sources [10, 39, 50] , on mechanisms for identifying which individuals to trust based on their past activity [2, 20, 27] , and on the manipulation of online recommendation systems [25] . The work we have just cited can be thought of as helping agents to decide who is worthy of trust. A development from a slightly different perspective -that of making it possible to trust individuals who might otherwise be deemed untrustworthy -is the idea of having individuals indemnify each other by placing some form of financial guarantee on transactions that others enter into [8, 9] . Thus I might indemnify you against a third party that I trust, thus making you feel comfortable doing business with them.
Trust is an especially important issue from the perspective of autonomous agents and multiagent systems [48] . The premise behind the multiagent systems field is that of developing software agents that will work in the interests of their owners, carrying out their owners' wishes while interacting with other entities. In such interactions, agents will have to reason about the amount that they should trust those other entities, whether they are trusting those entities to carry out some task, or whether they are trusting those entities to not misuse crucial information. As a result we find much work on trust in agent-based systems [45, 49] , including work that identifies weaknesses in some of the major trust models [46] .
In the work in this area, it is common to assume that agents maintain a trust network of their acquaintances, which includes ratings of how much those acquaintances are trusted, and how much those acquaintances trust their acquaintances, and so on. One natural question to ask in this context is what inference is reasonable in such networks. The propagation of trust -both the transitivity of trust relations [44, 49] and more complex relationships like "co-citation" [19] -has been studied. In many cases this work has been empirically validated [19, 23, 24] .
In a previous paper [37] , we suggested that, given the role that provenance plays in trust [16, 17] , argumentation -which tracks the origin of data used in reasoningmight play a role. We have developed a graph-based model to explore the relationship between argumentation and trust [47] . Here we explore a different direction, discussing how the usual approach to dealing with trust information can be captured in logic, how it can be integrated with argumentation-based reasoning about beliefs, and how it might be used in a combined system.
Trust
We are interested in a finite set of agents Ags and how these agents trust one another. Following the usual presentation (for example [23, 44, 49] ), we start with a trust relation: τ ⊆ Ags × Ags which identifies which agents trust one another. If τ (Ag i , Ag j ), where Ag i , Ag j ∈ Ags, then Ag i trusts Ag j . This is not a symmetric relation, so it is not necessarily the case
It is natural to represent this trust relation as a directed graph, and we define a trust network to be a graph comprising, respectively, a set of nodes and a set of edges:
where Ags is a set of agents and {τ } is the set of pairwise trust relations over Ags so that if τ (Ag i , Ag j ) is in {τ } then {Ag i , Ag j } is a directed arc from Ag i to Ag j in T indicating that Ag i trusts Ag j . In this graph, the set of agents is the set of vertices, and the trust relations define the arcs. A directed path between agents in the trust network implies that one agent indirectly trusts another. For example if:
is a path from agent Ag 1 to Ag n , then we have: Ag 3 ) , . . . , τ(Ag n−1 , Ag n ) and the path gives us a means to compute the trust that Ag 1 has in Ag n . The usual assumption in the literature is that we can place some measure on the trust relation, quantifying the trust that one agent has in another, so we have:
where tr gives a suitable trust value. In this paper, we take this value to be between 0, indicating no trust, and 1, indicating the greatest possible degree of trust. We assume that tr and τ are mutually consistent, so that:
Now, this just deals with the direct trust relations encoded in τ . It is usual in work on trust to consider performing inference about trust by assuming that trust relations are transitive. This is easily captured in the notion of a trust network. The notion of trust embodied here is exactly Jøsang's "indirect trust" or "derived trust" [21] and the process of inference is what [19] calls "direct propagation". If we have a function tr, then we can compute:
for some operation ⊗ tr . Here we follow [49] in using the symbol ⊗, to stand for this generic operation. 1 The superscript distinguishes this from a similar operation ⊗ bel on belief values which we will meet below.
Sometimes it is the case that there are two or more paths through the trust network between Ag i and Ag j indicating that Ag i has several opinions about the trustworthiness of Ag j . If these two paths are 
Again we use the standard notation ⊕ for a function that combines trust measures along two paths [49] . Clearly we can extend this to handle the combination of more than two paths.
As an example of a trust graph, consider Figure 1 which shows the trust relationship between john, mary, alice, jane, paul and dave. This is adapted from the example in [23] by normalizing the values to lie between 0 and 1 and adding paul. The solid lines are direct trust relationships and the dotted lines are indirect links derived from the direct links. Thus, for example, john trusts jane and dave because he trusts mary and mary trusts jane and dave.
The standard approach in the literature on trust is to base the computation of derived trust values on the the trust graph, for example using a path algebra [44] . Our aim in this paper is to demonstrate how we might use logic, and in particular argumentation, to propagate trust values. In other words we want an argumentation-based approach that john can use to determine that he has a reason to trust dave, and then use to combine this trust with his other knowledge to make decisions.
Reasoning about trust
We will start by considering how to capture reasoning about trust in logic. We will assume that every agent Ag i has some collection of information about the world, which we will call ∆ i , that is expressed in logic. ∆ i is made up of a number of partitions, one of which, ∆ tr i , holds information about the degree of trust Ag i has in other agents it knows. For example, the agent john from the above example might have the following collection of information: ∆ 
and
where the elements of ∆ tr john are the kind of triples that we have discussed in earlier work [35] . Each element has the form:
The first is a means of referring to the element, the second is a formula, and here the third is the degree of trust between the individuals mentioned in the trust relation.
From ∆ tr john we can then construct arguments mirroring the trust propagation discussed above. Rules for doing this are given in Figure 2 .
2 For example, using the first two rules, from Figure 2 , Ax tr and dp, we can construct the argument:
where all arguments in our approach take the form:
(conclusion : grounds : rules : value)
The conclusion is inferred from the grounds using the rules of inference rules and with degree value. In this case the argument says john trusts jane with degreẽ t (which is 0.9 ⊗ tr 0.7), through two applications of the rule Ax tr and one application of the rule dp to the two facts indexed by t1 and t2. The rule Ax tr says that if some agent Ag i has a triple:
(t1 : trusts(john, mary) : 0.9) in its ∆ tr i then it can construct an argument for trusts(john, mary) where the grounds are t1, the degree of trust is 0.9, and which records that the Ax tr rule was used in its derivation.
The rule dp captures direct propagation of trust values. It says that if we can show that trusts(x, y) holds with degreed and we can show that trusts(y, z) holds with degreeẽ, then we are allowed to conclude trusts(x, z) with a degreed ⊗ trẽ , and that the conclusion is based on the union of the information that supported the premises, and is computed using all the rules used by both the premises.
Why is this interesting? After all, it does no more than trace paths through the trust graph.
Well, one of the strengths of argumentation, and the reason we are interested in using argumentation to handle trust, is that we want to record, in the form of the argument for some proposition, the reasons that it should be believed. Since information on the source of some piece of data, and the trust that an agent has in the source, is relevant, then it should be recorded in the argument. This is easier to achieve if we encode data about who trusts whom in logic.
One of the nice things that this approach allows us to do is to track the application of the rules for propagating trust. When we just use direct propagation, this is not terribly interesting (though it does allow us to distinguish between the bits of information used in the formation of arguments, which may be a criterion for preferring one argument over another [28] ), but it becomes more obviously useful when we start to allow other rules for propagating trust. For example, [19] suggests a rule the authors call co-citation, which they describe as:
For example, suppose i 1 trusts j 1 and j 2 and i 2 trusts j 2 . Under co-citation, we would conclude that i 2 should also trust j 1 .
In our example (see Figure 1) , therefore, co-citation suggests that since alice trusts jane and paul, and mary trusts jane, then mary should trust paul. (Presumably the idea is that since alice and mary agree on the trustworthiness of jane, mary should trust alice's opinion about paul). [19] also tells us how trust values should be combined in this case -mary's trust in paul is just the combination of trust values along the path from mary to jane to alice to paul.
This form of reasoning is captured by the rule cc in Figure 2 , and the rule also takes care of the necessary bookkeeping of grounds, proof rules and trust values. Combining the application of cc with dp as before allows the construction of the argument: ∆ tr john tr (trusts(john, paul) : {t1, t2, t4, t5} : rules 1 :r) indicating that john trusts paul, where rules 1 is:
andr is 0.9 ⊗ tr 0.7 ⊗ tr 0.6 ⊗ tr 0.4. Now, when we have several rules for propagating trust, keeping track of which rule has been used in which derivation is appealing, especially since one might want to distinguish between arguments that use different rules of inference. For example, one might prefer arguments, no matter the trust value, which only make use of direct propagation over those that make use of co-citation. 4 
Reasoning with trust
What we have presented so far explains how agent Ag i can reason about the trustworthiness of its acquaintances. The reason for doing this is so Ag i can use its trust information to decide how to use information that it gets from those acquaintances. To formalize the way in which Ag i does this, we will assume that, in addition to ∆ tr i , Ag i has a set of beliefs about the world ∆ bel i (which we assume come with some measure of belief), and some information ∆ j i provided by each of its acquaintances Ag j , and that:
Part of the bel consequence relation All of this information can then be used, along with the consequence relation from Figure 3 , to construct arguments that combine trust and beliefs. The proof rules in Figure 3 are based on those we introduced in [30] . The rule Ax bel , as in the previous set of proof rules, bootstraps an argument from a single item of information, while the rules ∧-I and →-E are typical natural deduction rules -the rules for introducing a conjunction and eliminating implication -augmented with the combination of degrees of belief, and the collection of information on which data and proof rules have been used. (The full consequence relation would need an introduction rule and elimination rule for every connective in the language, and the definition of these is easy enough -we omit them here in the interest of space.)
The key rule in Figure 3 is the rule named Trust. This says that if it is possible to construct an argument for θ from some ∆ i j , indicating that the information comes from Ag j , and Ag i trusts Ag j , then Ag i has an argument for θ. The grounds of this argument combine all the data that was used from ∆ i j and all the information about trust used to determine that Ag i trusts Ag j , and the set of rules in the argument record all the inferences needed to build this combined argument. Finally, the belief that Ag i has in the argument is the belief in θ as it was derived from ∆ i j combined with the trust Ag i has in Ag j . We carry out this last combination by first turning the trust value into a belief value using some suitable function ttb(·).
In other words, this rule sanctions the use of information from an agent's acquaintances, provided that the degree of belief in that piece of information is modified by the agent's trust in that acquaintance. Thus one agent can only import information from another agent if the first agent can construct a trust argument that determines it should trust the second (and so trigger the Trust rule).
Example
To see how this combined system might work, consider the rest of the example from [23] that goes with Figure 1 (suitably modified to provide an example of co-citation, which is not considered in the original). The trust network from [23] is based on data from the FilmTrust site 5 which features social networks centered around the exchange of information about films.
In the example, john has the following information, where x is a universally quantified variable, almodovar is the director Pedro Almodovar, and hce is an abbreviation for the 2002 film Hable con ella (Talk to her): We take this to mean that john thinks that hce is a Spanish language film, and that it is directed by Almodovar. In addition, he doesn't much like to watch comedies. john also has some information from FilmTrust connections:
∆ paul john (jp1 : Comedy(hce) : 0.6) Thus john hears from mary that hce is an independent film, from jane that her advice is to not watch Spanish independent films, from dave who says any of Almodovar's films are worth seeing, and from paul who points out that he thinks hce is a comedy. Now, we have already seen how john can construct arguments for trusting jane and paul, though we did not say what ⊗ tr was so that we could not compute the degrees of trust. For now, we follow [44] in taking ⊗ tr to be minimum, thus giving us: Each of the arguments can then be used with bel ( Figure 3 ) to construct arguments that are relevant to the question of whether john should watch hce. Using information from jane he can determine:
∆ john bel (¬W atch(hce) : {t1, t2, jj1, jm1, j1} : rules 2 :b)
5 http://trust.mindswap.org/FilmTrust/ where rules 2 = {Ax tr , Ax tr , dp, T rust, T rust, Ax bel , ∧-I, →-E} This shows that after the derivation of information about trusting jane, the proof of ¬W atch(hce) requires the application of T rust to establish a degree of belief in jane's information, T rust to import jm1 from mary, an application of Ax bel to create an argument from j1, the use of ∧-I to combine the data from j1 and jm1, and then →-E to get the conclusion.
To establishb, we need to determine what the function ⊗ bel is, and how to convert trust values to beliefs using ttb(·). For our purposes here, the choice doesn't matter greatly -we aren't arguing that any particular combination of operations for trust combination, belief combination and ttb(·) is best, just that if we have these operations then john can use information in a way that seems to be useful. For now we handle beliefs using possibility theory [5] -which is basically equivalent to the approach adopted by [3] to handle variable strength arguments -and interpret the degree of trust in an agent to be a degree of belief that what the agent says is true [14, 32] , so that ttb(·) is just the identity. All of this means thatb = 0.7.
john can also construct the following arguments as a result of information from, respectively, paul and dave, in much the same way as the argument above. First we have:
∆ john bel (¬W atch(hce) : {t1, t2, t4, t5, jp1, j3} : rules 3 : 0.4) where rules 3 = {Ax tr , Ax tr , Ax tr , Ax tr , dp, cc, T rust, Ax bel , →-E} and second we have:
∆ john bel (W atch(hce) : {t1, t3, jd1, j1, j2} : rules 4 : 0.6) where rules 4 = {Ax tr , Ax tr , dp, T rust, Ax bel , Ax bel , →-E} This means that john has three arguments that bear on his decision about whether to watch hce, one in favor and two against.
Using trust values
At this point in the example, we have arguments for opposing conclusions -john should watch hce and john should not watch it. To reach a decision about hce, john needs to choose between these conclusions. There are a number of different approaches to using the trust information to do this, and in this section we discuss some of them, showing how they affect the example. The aim here is not to provide a definitive answer but to explain some of the options -as we hope that these examples will demonstrate, it is not immediately clear which is the best approach.
Flattening
The first approach is for john to proceed by combining the arguments for the formula ¬W atch(hce) (what [35] calls "flattening" the arguments) and seeing if the resulting combination outweighs the argument for W atch(hce). We have three arguments to consider:
A 1 (¬W atch(hce) : {t1, t2, jj1, jm1, j1} : rules 2 : 0.7) A 2 (¬W atch(hce) : {t1, t2, t4, t5, jp1, j3} :
(W atch(hce) : {t1, t3, jd1, j1, j2} : rules 4 : 0.6)
Flattening combines the two beliefs, 0.7 and 0.4 for ¬W atch(hce), to get a combined measure. Given that we are taking the values to be possibility values, it makes sense to combine them using max, thus getting a combined value of 0.7 for ¬W atch(hce). This is greater than the 0.6 for W atch(hce), and so under this scheme, john would conclude that he should not watch hce.
Given the choice of combination operator for flattening, this approach is very simple -the choice supported by the strongest single argument will always win. It also largely ignores conflicts between the arguments. In the example so far, we just have arguments that rebut one another, and the result of flattening seems very reasonable. But what if we have more conflicts? Consider extending the example so that john has additional information: so john is now certain that anything directed by Almodovar is not an independent film. This gives him an additional argument:
Thus john now has a strong argument against hce being an independent film, and this clearly conflicts with A 1 since it contradicts the information from mary about hce being an independent film. A 4 however, is ignored by flattening, and this doesn't seem very reasonable.
Acceptability analysis
Of course, handling this kind of conflict is exactly what Dung's acceptability semantics [11] and subsequent variations on this theme [6, 12] are intended to do. Let's examine what they tell john in this scenario. [11] starts from the position of knowing which arguments conflict, assuming a relation that specifies:
for all conflicts between arguments. Since we are starting from a less abstract position, we need to define what constitutes this relation in our example. The notion of conflict between arguments used in [3] translates into our formulation of an argument as saying that (c :
That is one argument attacks another by disputing the truth of one of its grounds, "undercutting" it in the usual terminology. 6 ([3] also places some constraints on the strengths of the arguments v and v , but we will leave those for now.) We will extend this notion of attack to include arguments rebutting each other, so that for our purposes (c :
and the argument graph is that of Figure 4 . What john concludes from this depends on the way that he computes which arguments are acceptable. However, none of the different approaches from [11] will help him decide what to watch. If he applies the grounded semantics, the only acceptable argument is A 4 , which doesn't tell him what to watch. If he applies the complete, preferred or stable semantics, they will all tell him that A 4 is acceptable along with A 2 or A 3 , but give no further guidance. As a result, while in other scenarios this analysis may suffice, in this case it leaves john no wiser about whether he should watch hce or not.
Since the basic acceptability analysis is not very informative, and since we have a degree of belief associated with each argument, we can incorporate the degrees of belief into the analysis. To do this, we extend our notion of attack with the mechanism that [3] uses to handle strength of arguments. Broadly speaking (and counting rebutting as well as undercutting arguments), what [3] says is that (c :
or there is some g ∈ G such that c ≡ ¬g, and v ≥ v . Thus if an argument has a conflict with a strictly stronger argument, that conflict is ignored in establishing the attacks relation. With this definition we have:
Fig . 5 . The argumentation graph for the film example when the strengths of arguments are taken into account.
and the argument graph is that of Figure 5 . This time, any of the standard semantics from [11] tells john that the acceptable arguments are A 3 and A 4 , and so his conclusion using this approach is that he should watch hce.
The approaches we have discussed up to now are direct applications of existing approaches to using arguments with some form of belief value, and only use the trust information as a mechanism to establish arguments about beliefs. Our investigation is also considering three other approaches, in which we use the trust value directly. We will discuss these next.
Trust thresholds
The first of these new approaches is the use of trust thresholds. The formal model we are using here considers an agent to have information from a number of acquaintances, each of which has some trust rating that is applied to the information from that agent. A natural approach to using the trust rating is to specify a threshold value below which information from an agent is disregarded.
In the case of our film example, john might set his trust threshold to 0.5, thus not accepting information from any acquaintance y for which he cannot infer:
(trusts(john, y) : G : R : v) for some v > 0.5. (One might formulate this as an additional condition in the Trust rule in the bel relation.) Doing this would rule out any information from paul, and hence john would only have A 1 , A 3 and A 4 . Of course, using the threshold doesn't answer john's question on its own -he still has arguments for and against watching hce, so he will have to use a method like those outlined above to resolve the conflict. If, for example, john chooses to use the acceptability semantics without considering the strengths of the arguments, this time he will find that all the standard semantics say that A 3 is acceptable and so he should watch(hce). (The outcome of the two other approaches are not affected by the threshold, but it does mean that there are fewer arguments to consider.)
A number of questions arise about the use of thresholds. To what extent, for example, does imposing such a threshold on the information from its acquaintances protect an agent from using untrustworthy information? In other words, does excluding information from acquaintances with a trust value below some α mean that all of the agent's conclusions will be more trustworthy than α? Or are there circumstances under which less trustworthy conclusions could be reached even if data from agents below the threshold is excluded? We have shown that under some circumstances the trust threshold will give us this protection [38] , but in case of our example, it won't. Imagine that the threshold is set to 0.65, ruling out data from any agent except mary and jane, so john has just A 4 and A 1 (and so no opinion about whether to watch hce because the only attack is that of A 4 on A 1 which makes A 1 unacceptable). Can this be altered by information below the threshold, say from mary, who is highly trusted, but maybe has some low belief information about the watchability of hce? It might. If mary has information that leads to an argument A 5 with conclusion watch(hce) and a belief of 0.5 say, it won't be excluded by the threshold (which only applies to mary not to data from mary), and A 5 will be acceptable (because the attacking argument A 1 is itself attacked by A 4 ), giving the conclusion watch(hce). Our current work is trying to establish what are reasonable levels of protection that may be provided by trust thresholds, and for which combinations of interpretations for trust and belief values the levels of protection hold. Now, given an arbitrary threshold, there may be no arguments for or against watching hce for which the grounds are all above the threshold -meaning that john has no arguments to consider -but many arguments with elements of their grounds just below the threshold -meaning that john would consider them if the threshold was lower. For such cases john might want to consider altering the threshold, and so we are interested in how the protection offered by the threshold is altered when the threshold moves.
Another interesting question is to examine the interaction between thresholds and propagation in the trust network. What correspondence is there between imposing a trust threshold and pruning the acquaintances from the network? Clearly when we combine trust values along a path through the network using min, a threshold will rule out trusting any agent downstream of an agent below the threshold, but this may not necessarily be the case when trust values are computed in different ways. Again, this is a matter that we are currently investigating.
Trust budget
The second new approach is, in some ways, an extension of the first. Using a trust threshold rules out acquaintances -or alternatively conclusions that are supported by information from those acquaintances -when the level of trust in an acquaintance drops below a particular level. Thus very untrustworthy acquaintances, and the information they provide, are ruled out. But equally, information from sources above the threshold is ruled in, along with conclusions based on it, even if a given conclusion depends upon lots of items of information that came from sources close to the threshold, and so might be considered more suspect than others based on sources further from the threshold.
The notion of a trust budget is intended to deal with this situation. A trust budget specifies the total amount of distrust that is permitted in the sources of data that lead to a single conclusion. In situations where trust values are, as in our example, between 0 and 1, we can compute the "cost" of Ag i accepting information from a series of acquaintances Ag j as:
To illustrate this idea on the example, let us first imagine that john sets the trust budget to 1. Given the levels of trust that john has in his acquaintances, this allows him to accept information from at most any three of jane (cost to the trust budget of 0.3), paul (0.6), dave (0.3) and mary (0.1). For example, john might spend the whole trust budget and accept information from jane, paul and mary, giving him the conclusion that he should not watch hce. Or he might spend part of the budget accepting information from jane, dave and mary, from which he would conclude that he should watch hce.
Given a specific budget, john can identify which conclusion or conclusions that fit within the budget have the highest belief (here it is ¬watch(hce)). Alternatively john might consider slowly increasing his trust budget from 0 until he reaches a conclusion about the question he is interested in -here he would have to "spend" at least 0.3 to get a conclusion (in this case to not watch hce, based on A 1 obtained by accepting information from jane). Another approach to using the trust budget would be to have john establish what he needs to "spend" in order to find a conclusion he wants. In the context of the example, let's imagine he is interested in watching hce but wants to know how trusting he has to be to decide that it is a good idea. The minimum budget necessary to establish watch(hce) as a conclusion is 0.6, the cost of trusting paul, since it only takes information from paul to construct an argument for watch(hce) (in more complex examples it might be necessary to trust several agents to reach an interesting conclusion). 8 In general, the questions to ask about a trust budget are similar to those for a trust threshold, identifying how well-behaved this notion is, and what protection an agent gets by imposing such a budget. These questions are, like those for trust thresholds, subjects of our ongoing research. Furthermore, as suggested by [13] , in the context of the related notion of an "inconsistency budget", and [26] , in the context of optimal trust path selection, the kinds of uses we are seeking to make of the trust budget are uses that will require considerable computation. This is another topic we are considering.
Meta-argumentation
The previous two approaches are concerned with handling the values derived from the trust network. These values are then used to make decisions about which piece of information, and thus which arguments (since arguments are derived from the information) are considered by an agent. The final approach we are looking at leans more towards the kind of structural analysis described by Loui [28] , where heuristic patterns of evidence and argument structure are used to decide which arguments are preferred. An example is the preference for arguments using only data from agents that are directly trusted by Ag i over arguments that use data from agents that Ag i trusts by co-citation. The aim of this approach is to identify general heuristics for dealing with trust data, and to verify the plausibility, or otherwise, of the kinds of inference that they sanction.
Summary
In this paper, we have outlined work on reasoning about trust using a form of argumentation which, as the paper demonstrated, can be integrated with a system of argumentation that uses the conclusions about trust. A notable feature of the system for reasoning about trust is its flexibility -new approaches to propagating trust can easily be added (or, indeed, removed) by altering the proof rules that are used in propagation. The combined system was illustrated with an example, and current directions sketched.
Clearly the systems we have described are work in progress. Neither of the formal systems is complete as presented -both are missing much of the proof mechanism and a proper description of the syntax at the very least -and neither is rigorously evaluated. Our aim was simply to illustrate the basic ideas captured in the systems, and to illustrate the possibilities that they offer. We have also completely ignored the computational aspects of implementing a software system that employs these approaches. Our future work will, in due course, fill in the details that are missing here, more completely relate this work to approaches with similar aims, such as [29, 33] , and provide an implementation. However, we believe that the work we have presented here has value in describing an area of research that we think is interesting and identifying some new approaches to handling it.
